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Abstract.  Human operators in control rooms are often responsible of issuing 
critical commands, and in charge of managing sensitive data. Insiders must be 
prevented to operate on the system: they may benefit of their position in the 
control room to fool colleagues, and gain access to machines or accounts. This 
paper proposes an authentication system for deterring and detecting malicious 
access to the workstations of control rooms. Specifically tailored for the 
operators in the control room of the crisis management system Secure!, the 
solution aims to guarantee authentication and non-repudiation of operators, 
reducing the risk that unauthorized personnel (including intruders) misuses a 
workstation. A continuous multi-biometric authentication mechanism is 
developed and applied in which biometric data is acquired transparently from 
the operator and verified continuously through time. This paper presents the 
authentication system design and prototype, its execution and experimental 
results. 
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1 Introduction 
Secure user authentication is fundamental for several ICT (Information and 
Communication Technology) systems. User authentication systems are traditionally 
based on pairs of username and password and verify the identity of the user only at 
login phase. No checks are performed during working sessions, which are terminated 
by an explicit logout or expire after an idle activity period of the user. While this is 
often sufficient, it may not result enough against insider attackers [14, 18] in control 
rooms, where operators are using their workstation to access potentially sensitive data 
and to issue critical commands for the entire working session; the operators are 
directly responsible for such commands and for the data accessed, modified and 
deleted. 
In this paper we consider the behavior and actions of the human operators working 
in the control room of the Secure! [1] crisis management system. Such operators are in 
charge of analysing and interpreting situations that describe the current status of an 
emergence. Using the information available, the operator from his workstation 
(mainly via text messages, using a keyboard) is able to command intervention teams 
on field, and to dispatch instructions to civilians in the target area. More details 
regarding the objectives of the Secure! project and its resulting system are available in 
[1]. 
It is required to protect the control rooms and its workstations from unauthorized 
people (intruders) and insiders that may want to acquire privacy-sensitive data, disrupt 
the crisis management operations, disseminate false information, or simply commit 
errors, which will be ascribed to the operator in charge of the workstation.  
Consequently, in order to protect the workstations, we need to guarantee (i) 
authenticity of the commands/functions executed, meaning that commands that are 
transmitted and expected from an operator, are actually generated from him, and (ii) 
non-repudiation of the commands/functions executed, meaning that the worker which 
sends the commands from a workspace is known. 
To timely detect misuses of computer resources and prevent that an unauthorized 
user maliciously replaces an authorized one, solutions based on biometric continuous 
authentication [2] are proposed in literature, turning user verification into a 
continuous process rather than a one time occurrence [3]. Additionally, to improve its 
security, biometrics authentication can rely on multiple biometrics traits thus, being 
multi-modal. Finally, biometric data can be acquired transparently i.e., without 
explicitly notifying the user or requiring his/her interaction, aiming to improve service 
usability [5].  
In this paper, we investigate a continuous multi-modal biometric authentication 
protocol for transparent verification of the operator identity in the Secure! control 
room, concretely presenting how to implement the approach on a real life case study. 
Starting from an analysis of solutions available in the state of the art, we tailored a 
solution that integrates face, fingerprint and keystroke recognitions. Face data is 
acquired using a camera, fingerprint data is acquired via a fingerprint sensor 
integrated in the mouse, and keystroke data is instead acquired via the keyboard. 
The protocol removes the necessity of explicit interactions to prove the operator 
identity, and thanks to the multi-modality, it allows acquiring biometric data also 
when different operators are using the same workstation. For example, if more 
operators are in front of the camera thus in some cases compromising the face 
recognition, the legitimate operator can still use the fingerprint reader. Finally, 
authenticity and non-repudiation are guaranteed by the continuous authentication, 
which is intended to assure that the operator is within range of the workstation during 
its use. 
The rest of the paper describes in Sect. 2 some of the available solution from the 
state of the art and the advancements of our work, in Sect. 3 the design of our tailored 
solution and in Sect. 4 the realization of our prototype. Results on its execution are 
reported in Sect. 5. Finally, conclusions are in Sect. 6. 
2 Multi-modal Biometric Continuous Authentication 
Biometrics refers to a measurement of physiological and/or behavioral characteristics 
of the human body; a biometric recognition system provides an automated method for 
confirming (verification) or determining (identification) the identity of an individual 
  
based on his characteristics [7]. Identity verification, which is the target of our work, 
consists of a one-to-one matching and occurs when an individual claims his identity. 
The system needs to compare the newly acquired biometric data and the previously 
enrolled digital representation of an individual’s biometric characteristics, usually 
called templates. It is well-known that using multiple biometric characteristics 
combined with an appropriate rule, that is, providing a multi-modal biometric 
authentication, can yield a higher performance than using only one trait [15, 16]. 
Surveying the state of the art, a large number of studies can be identified regarding 
biometric continuous authentication. We review approaches on biometric 
authentication systems based on multi-modality and continuous verification where a 
transparent acquisition of biometric data is researched. Each of them could be used for 
our purpose but for each one we can find at least one reason that suggests the 
introduction of a new approach, ad-hoc for our requirements. 
The work in [2] describes a multi-modal biometric passive continuous 
authentication system, combining face and fingerprint recognition to verify the physical 
presence of a user. The authors state that it introduces a significant overhead (between 
26% and 42%) and the user’s task are delayed; the reason is probably the bottleneck 
generated by a too frequent acquisition of the face (two times for each second) and 
fingerprint images (once per second). 
The work in [3] proposes a multi-modal continuous biometric authentication system 
integrating information temporally as well as across multiple biometric modalities. The 
main idea of the method is based on the assumption that as time passes, the 
authentication system is less and less certain about the authentication score value. 
Experiments show that temporal information improves authentication accuracy. 
However, the acquisition of 15 images in less than a second suggests that the impact of 
this solution in terms of computational resource usage would be relevant, and seems 
legitimate to expect it would weigh down the system. 
In [4] the objective is to investigate the opportunity of using a multimodal biometric 
system as input of a fuzzy controller for preventing user substitution after the initial 
authentication process. The chosen modalities are face and fingerprint. The role of the 
fuzzy controller is to request the fingerprint data only if the face recognition matching 
produces a trust level that is below a threshold. Nevertheless, we need a transparent 
acquisition of the traits and the explicit request of the fingerprint does not meet this 
requirement.  
Finally, the work in [12, 13] proposes a continuous multi-modal sequential 
biometric authentication solution, where trust in the user is computed after each 
successful user identity verification and it is decreased as time passes without 
successful verifications. An authentication server is in charge of receiving biometric 
data, performs verifications and computes trust in the user. We adopt the trust 
formulation from [12, 13] because of its simplicity and easiness to adapt to different 
systems and sensors. Relevant tailoring w.r.t. [12, 13] was needed due to the different 
requirements of our system, in fact we are considering a control room with 
workstations and a defined set of sensors, selected on the basis of the usual actions of 
trained operators, rather than potentially any environment, kind of device, and user. For 
example, the operator is expected to have his hand on the mouse for most of the time, 
and this leads to introducing a fingerprint reader in the mouse. In addition, our system 
automatically grants access to all critical functions after login, while [12, 13] protects 
communication towards each specific service individually. 
3 Our Approach to Continuous Authentication 
The overall architecture of the biometric system is composed of the operators' 
workstations and the connected sensors required to acquire the biometric data. 
Biometric data are transmitted to an authentication system, which includes a database 
with the biometric templates of the operators. 
3.1 The protocol 
In our protocol, the different biometric data are acquired continuously by the 
workstation, and the identity of the operator is verified; an estimation of the trust in 
the operator is then computed. Such trust is described as a value ranging through time 
in the interval [0; 1], and that decreases through time, at different rating speeds, 
depending on the action and behaviour of the operator (w.r.t. the available sensors). 
The trust value increases only when fresh biometric data is acquired and successfully 
verified. When such trust value is lower than a given threshold, the permissions of the 
operator are reduced thus limiting the possible actions that they can execute on the 
Secure! system until a new login is performed. 
Considering the operator of the Secure! system and comparing a set of well-known 
biometric traits [6], we selected the following three traits for multimodal biometric 
authentication. First, fingerprints are acquired using a sensor integrated in the mouse 
[8] that will be described in Section 4, thus allowing fingerprint recognition. Second, 
facial images are acquired using a camera (a webcam) allowing face recognition. 
Third, keystroke data are acquired with keyboard allowing keystroke recognition. The 
objective is to combine the transparent and sequential acquisition of the above data to 
continuously assure trust in the operator. 
The three above biometric traits have different levels of performance and 
measurability [6, 7] and complement each other. High measurability of facial images 
will help covering temporal gaps that could exist between two fingerprint 
acquisitions. Keystroke supports the other two traits despite its low performance. 
Especially keystroke can results useful when fingerprint acquisitions are missing e.g., 
because the operator is not touching the mouse: in fact, when the operators are typing 
on the keyboard, they are most likely unable to place their finger on the fingerprint 
reader.  
Thus, we introduce a mechanism where (i) keystroke recognition on the text typed 
is executed in order to recognize the operator, and (ii) the usage of the keyboard is 
considered a justification for the absence of fingerprint acquisition. All these 
considerations will influence the computation of the trust in the operator. 
In the rest of the paper, we present the implementation of the authentication system, 
where we choose three exemplary recognition algorithms, but we imagine that our 
method can work efficiently also with different face, fingerprint and keystroke 




The proposed continuous authentication protocol is shown in the sequence 
diagram of Fig. 1. It is based on three biometric subsystems, one for each trait, where 
each subsystem is composed of hw/sw elements necessary for the acquisition of biometric 
traits and for the verification process, including sensors and recognition algorithms.  
The protocol is divided in two phases: the initial phase and the maintenance phase. 
 
Initial phase. It is composed of the following steps: 
- The user logs in to start a session that will also imply the possibility of using 
functionalities that need authentication. A strong authentication is here needed for 
login, with a one-time password (a password that is valid for only one login session 
or transaction) or by a successful biometric verification executed with all the three 
subsystems in a short time interval. 
- Data are acquired by the workstation and transmitted to the authentication server. 
- The authentication server uses the operator’s templates contained in a biometric 
database and verifies his identity. In case of successful verification, the 
authentication server communicates to the Secure! system to establish a session 
and to allow all restricted functions expected for the operator's role. In addition, the 
authentication server computes and updates a trust level that decreases as time 
passes (trust computation is described in the next subsection); the session will expire 
when such level becomes lower than a threshold. The maintenance phase is started 
to compute a new trust level.  
 
Fig. 1. Sequence diagram of the protocol 
Maintenance phase. The biometric continuous authentication protocol works as 
follows: 
- The authentication server waits for fresh biometric data, from any of the three 
subsystems. No active participation of the operator is necessary, which only needs 
to use the mouse, the keyboard or to be positioned in front of the camera. 
- When new biometric data is available for the different biometric subsystems, the 
authentication server verifies the identity claimed by the operator and, depending 
on the matching results of each subsystem, updates the trust level. 
- When the trust level is close to the threshold, the authentication server sends a 
notification to the operator, to signal that in case biometric data is not transmitted, 
the session will expire soon. 
- If the trust level is below the threshold, the authentication server communicates to 
the Secure! system to disable the restricted functions and notifies the operator that 
his session is expired. In this case, the operator can access only a set of non- 
restricted functions, i.e., functions with no or reduced criticality in terms of privacy 
and confidentiality.  
The disabled functions will be available again only when the operator performs a 
strong authentication, restarting from the initial phase.  
3.2 Internals: the trust level computation 
We now introduce some concepts useful to describe the algorithm for trust level 
computation, without the intent of being generic but focusing the discussion on the 
specificities of our system and the biometric traits used. A generic approach can be 
derived from the discussion below whenever needed.  
Given the three unimodal biometric subsystems S1=fingerprint recognition, S2=face 
recognition, S3=keystroke recognition such that each one is able to decide 
independently if the user is genuine or not, we define m(S1), m(S2), m(S3) as the trust in 
the subsystem respectively S1, S2, S3. The m(S1), m(S2), m(S3) are static values that lie 
in the interval [0,1]; the more trust we place in a subsystem, the higher its value.  
We also define the trust level trust(u, t) that represents the trust put in the user u at 
time t by the authentication server. In other words, it corresponds to the probability that 
the operator u is legitimate considering his behavior using the workstation. It takes into 
account the time from last acquisition of biometric data, and the combination of the 
individual decisions of the three subsystems S1, S2, S3. Being considered as a 
probability, it is a value that lies the interval [0, 1]. 
Finally, we define a lower bound trustmin corresponding to the minimum threshold 
of the trust level requested by the authentication system. If trust(u, t) < trustmin, the 
authentication server disables the restricted functions. If instead trust(u, t) ≥ trustmin the 
user is maintained authenticated and the access to all restricted functions is granted. To 
ease the readability of the notation, in the following the operator u is often omitted. 
  
The algorithm for the computation of the trust level is executed iteratively on the 
authentication server as explained in what follows. In the initial phase, at time t0, the 
operator performs a strong authentication: if successful, the trust is set to trust(t0) =1. 
The maintenance phase is here started. Each subsystem continuously tries to 
acquire, on the workstation, the biometric data of the operator and transmits them to 
the authentication server. The authentication server verifies the operator identity using 
all biometric data provided in a specific time interval; let us consider the time interval 
[ti-1; ti] and consequently we reason for the status of the system at time instant ti. We 
have the following options at ti. In the first case, all the three biometric subsystems led 
to successful verification: the trust level is set to trust(ti) = 1. In the second case, two 
of the three biometric subsystems led to successful verification. This means that one 
biometric subsystem could not acquire data or decided that the operator is not 
legitimate. The trust level is computed following (1): 
                                              𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡(𝑡𝑖) = 𝑚(𝑆𝑘1) + (𝑟 ∙ 𝑚(𝑆𝑘2)).                                     (1) 
Where: 
 Sk1 and Sk2 are the two subsystems, which correctly verified the identity of the 
operator, and Sk2 is the one with the lower performance; 
 r is a parameter that allows to weight m(Sk2) in order to have trust(t0) between 0 
and 1.  
For example, setting r = 0.1, Sk1 = 0.9, Sk2 = 0.8, Sk3 = 0.7, we have the 
combinations reported in Table 1. The selection of these values can be conducted 
comparing the biometric traits, and from an analysis of their performance, i.e., in 
terms of number of false positives and false negatives produced by each. We found 
that these values can represent properly the accuracy of each subsystem, but other 
different values can be easily adopted, if necessary, following a similar approach. 
Until at least two subsystems do not decide that the user is legitimate in the same time 
interval, thus updating trust(ti) following Table 1, the trust level decreases and the 
session will expire when it is smaller than trustmin. If at ti at most one biometric 
verification is successful (e.g., for two biometric subsystems no biometric data is 
acquired, or verifications failed), the trust level trust(ti) is computed using the 
following.  
Supposing we have trust(ti-1) that is, the trust level computed at the previous 
iteration of the algorithm, we want to compute the new trust(ti), which will be smaller 
than trust(ti-1). Therefore, at time ti, the trust level is given by (2), [13]: 
𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡(𝑡𝑖) =
(− arctan((∆ti − 𝑠) ∙ 𝑘) +
𝜋
2) ∙ trust(ti−1)
− arctan(−𝑠 ∙ 𝑘) +
𝜋
2
.                          (2) 
Table 1. Example of the trust level computation 
Pair of biometric subsystems Trust level computed as in equation (1) 
Sk1, Sk2 0.9 + (0.1∙ 0.8) =0.98 
Sk1, Sk3 0.9 + (0.1∙ 0.7) =0.97 




 Where ∆ti = ti - ti-1, and parameters k and s are introduced to tune the decreasing 
function: k affects the inclination towards the falling inflection point and s allows 
anticipating or delaying the decay. 
The selection of k in particular affects the speed of the decrease of the trust level. 
We adopt three different values of k in order to provide three different kinds of 
decrease, described below. A fast decrease (k=0.01) is set when no verifications are 
successful or no biometric data is transmitted. In this case, the trust will rapidly 
decrease towards trustmin. An average decrease (k=0.001) is set if only one verification 
is successful, for any biometric subsystem. Finally, a slow decrease (k=0.0008) is set if 
face verification is successful and the usage of keyboard is detected, although data is 
not sufficient to perform keystroke recognition or keystroke recognition fails. This 
situation means that the Secure! operator is actually busy using the keyboard and he 
cannot send any fingerprint data, and that the amount of keys pressed is too low or too 
sparse to permit keystroke recognition. Thus, a small penalization is assigned to the 
trust in the operator, smoothly decreasing the trust level.  
4 The prototype  
4.1 Hardware prototype 
Our prototype is composed of two PCs. On the client side, the workstation that we are 
using in our Secure! prototype is a Fujitsu Lifebook A-530 with an Intel® Pentium® 
P6200, 4GB RAM, and running Windows 7, equipped with the following biometric 
sensors. For fingerprint acquisition, our choice is the SecuGen OptiMouse Plus mouse 
[8], which incorporates an optical fingerprint scanner at the place where a user would 
normally place their thumb. Such fingerprint scanner does not require active 
participation by the user, and therefore does not require that the operators periodically 
perform biometric-related tasks that are not part of their normal activities. For 
acquisition of the images for face recognition, we use the built-in camera of the 
workstation that can continuously capture images without the active cooperation of 
the user. For the acquisition of keyboard data, we collected them using the standard 
PS/2 keyboard integrated in the Fujitsu Lifebook. As authentication server, we are 
using an HP Pavilion Desktop PC500-420nl with processor i5-4460S and 8 GB RAM 
which is in the same local network of the workstation. 
 
4.2 Software design 
In this section, we describe our software implementation. All software we developed 
is implemented in Java. Client-server communication is based on RESTful web 
services, and developed using the Jersey framework, following the design 
specification of the Secure! project. 
The workstation software is started by a Client object, which activates the 
methods of (i) InvisibleFaceTracker, (ii) KeyListener and (iii) FingerPrintDetection. 
Each class contains respectively: (i) an algorithm that, exploiting the camera, saves an 
image if (at least one) face is detected, (ii) a procedure that, exploiting the SecuGen 
OptiMouse Plus, cyclically detects and saves a fingerprint which, when available, is 
  
transmitted to Client, (iii) an algorithm that detects the pressing of the keys. At fixed 
time intervals, a text file is saved containing, for each row, the press and release times 
for each pressed key. Such file is delivered to the authentication server. The Client is 
in charge of invoking the UploadFileService REST client to transmit via HTTP post 
the saved image, fingerprint and text file to the authentication server together with the 
client ID. 
On the authentication server, the TrustCalcService guides the biometric 
verification, the calculation of the trust level, and the communication of session 
expiration to the Secure! system and to the workstation. The TrustCalcService class 
contains the RESTful web service that receives the transmitted biometric traits from 
the client, and a REST client to communicate the session expiration to the 
workstation. Getting the information from the client, the web service decides which 
methods of the RecognitionHandler class should be called to start the verification 
process. Each subsystem produces a decision about the legitimate of the user, as 
explained in Sect. 3. At fixed time intervals, the trust level is raised according to Table 
1. Example of the trust level computation  or, if less than two traits are correctly 
verified, selecting the trust decaying function with the appropriate k value as in Eq. 
(2).  
However, for a final product realization, the implementation should integrate 
recognition algorithms with very high performance. Moreover, depending on the 
specific characteristics of the algorithms, the parameters and the time intervals have to 
be tuned properly. 
4.3 Enabling technologies 
The SecuGen’s FDx Software Developer Kit [8] provides low-level APIs for device 
initialization, fingerprint capture and matching functions. In the enrollment phase, 
templates are computed and stored in raw format. 
We customized the face recognition software available in [10]; this is able to (i) 
analyze the frames captured via a camera, (ii) locate a face in the frames, and then (iii) 
verify user’s identity. When a face is present in front of the camera, the algorithm [10] 
detects its presence; in most of the cases, this happens within approximately 40 ms. 
Otherwise, if a face is not present, the algorithm takes up to 200 ms to ultimately 
notify that no face is present. The implementation available in [10] requested the 
installation and configuration of OpenCV [9], an open source library that includes 
several hundreds of computer vision algorithms, and of JavaCV, the related Java 
interface. Our customization of the software was necessary in order to i) structure the 
implementation available in [10] in two client and a server sides, where the first is in 
charge of capturing images and deciding if a face is present, and the second performs 
verification, and ii) make the acquisition of the biometric data transparent and 
automatic, removing the graphical interface and interactions of the user with the 
software. An enrollment phase is obviously required, in which the operator ID is 
associated to a set of face templates. The verification phase compares the selected face 
to the enrolled templates to produce a matching result. 
Keystroke data acquisition relies on the library JNativeHook that provides 
keyboard (and mouse) listeners for Java. In particular, this library allows detecting 
keys press and release events and captures, in correspondence to those events, the time 
instant of the events. JNativeHook also permits to detect the keyboard usage (and the 
keys pressed), both if the user is typing in a specific text area or not: the cursor 
position is not relevant. This is consistent with our needs as we can capture keystroke 
data without being invasive for the activity of the control room operator. 
Relying on such library, we realized the keystroke recognition in the KeyAnalyzer 
class, implementing the algorithm described in [11]. Such algorithm continuously 
collects the keystroke dynamics (the typed key and related pressing and release time) 
and applies a penalty/reward function on the dataset to measure the confidence that 
the user has not changed in the selected time interval. An enrollment session is 
required where the operator types several sentences, to create a biometric template 
based on the timing information for each typed key and key combination [11].  
In our implementation of [11], when the keyboard is used with continuity i.e., 
there is evidence that someone is currently typing, we collect keystroke dynamics for 
a defined time interval and then we transmit all values to the authentication server. 
The selection of the time interval is critical because if the number of values collected 
is too low, verification will most likely fail: a short time interval would probably 
result ineffective for keystroke authentication following [11]. Moreover, a long time 
interval would imply a long wait before transmitting the values, thus risking that the 
session expires meanwhile. We evaluated that listening for up to 10 seconds of 
continuous typing was deemed sufficient to allow successful verification (we also 
remember that keystroke is the weakest of our biometric traits, and it is easily prone to 
false positives). 
4.4 Availability, security, privacy and performance 
The Secure! system implements solutions for the overall availability of the system, the 
security and the privacy of the information managed, stored or exchanged, following a 
threat and risk analysis that was performed at the beginning of the project [14]. The 
mitigations identified for risks and threats, including time-related ones, also consider 
the workstations, the authentication server, and the related communication channels. 
Although such analysis and the Secure! architecture are not within the scope of this 
paper, we present considerations on availability, security, privacy and performance 
that we believe relevant. 
Regarding availability, our authentication mechanism clearly requires that the 
authentication server and all communications channels in Fig. 1 are up and running. In 
case of unavailability of any of the above, the system administrator of the Secure! 
system is able to temporarily disable the continuous authentication, thus switching to a 
traditional password-based authentication approach. However, such alternative should 
be exploited only when needed and matched to immediate intervention for 
maintenance (strategies for rapid maintenance intervention are foreseen for the whole 
Secure! system). 
Protection of the biometric data exchanged and stored, together with protection of 
the communication between the entities of Fig. 1 is mandatory. Briefly, the system in 
Fig. 1 represents a closed system, where all interacting entities are known, all 
communications are cabled, and no external machines are accepted. Communications 
are ciphered, and access to the entities is protected; solutions for the protection of data 
  
and communications are defined and applied to the whole Secure! system, as it 
manages several other sensitive and secure data, in addition to the biometric ones. 
Privacy of data is fundamental in Secure! both for data related to crisis 
management and for data related to the continuous authentication, which describes the 
behaviour of the worker in the operating room. Although data management is part of 
the Secure! architecture, it is worthy to discuss the authentication data. Such data is 
stored for a limited time (few days), and then removed, thus the system maintains only 
the recent history on the behaviour of the user. Access to such history is regulated by 
the procedures of the operating room and it is allowed only to investigate on suspected 
security breaches. 
Regarding performance, the continuous authentication software executing on the 
workstation may potentially slow down the Secure! application used by the operator. 
We measured the overhead introduced on our prototype, resulting in approximately an 
increase of usage of 6% for CPU and 2% for RAM. Such overhead is limited and shall 
not affect the execution of the Secure! application. The authentication server is instead 
in charge of managing the biometric database and verifying the identities of the team 
of operators, thus it is subject to a relevant computational load especially for large 
teams. However, the authentication server is one of the (powerful) nodes of the 
Secure! framework, which has been built with scalability [17] in mind so that its 
nodes can be easily adapted to sustain high computational loads. 
4.5 Usability 
We comment on the impact of our authentication solution on the daily activities of the 
operator. The authentication solution and the values of its parameters were selected to 
achieve a compromise between security (a malicious operator is disconnected in at 
worst approximately 40 s, see Fig. 3) and  usability (the worker maintains the session 
active, mostly thanks to the fingerprint reader in the mouse, which is used most of the 
time, and the face recognition). The experiments in Sect. 5, which adopt the 
configurations selected for Secure!, confirm that a worker is able to maintain the 
authentication until he voluntarily leaves the workstation. We are aware that usability 
studies in daily working sessions with multiple Secure! operators are required; this is 
the main objective of the ongoing experimentation of our solution. 
5 Explanatory Results  
We report on three typical scenarios where 10 runs have been performed using the 
prototype and the data for one case are plotted. The configurations selected for 
Secure! are the same as Sect. 3; trust threshold is set to trustmin = 0.5. The objectives 
of the three scenario analysis are respectively i) verify that the operator working at a 
workstation is able to maintain authentication for a whole working the workstation is 
left unattended by the legitimate user, the trust will decay below the thresholds, iii) 
verify the requirements on the environment, especially on illumination.  
In the first scenario, an operator is in front of the client, working in an environment 
with good illumination. A working session of 50 minutes is performed: the operator  
 does not leave the workstation, and alternates the usage of keyboard and mouse to 
perform his work. An extract showing the initial part of one run is shown in Fig. 2 to 
clarify the behavior of the protocol. At the beginning of the run (at second 13), a 
strong authentication is successfully performed providing in a time slot the three 
biometric traits (the time slot is set to 10 seconds): this means that the three biometric 
data should be provided and successfully verified in such interval. Note that 
additional delays due to transmission and processing time should always be taken into 
account. After the initial authentication, at time intervals of around 20 seconds, the 
authentication server verifies the biometric data. The first and second time intervals 
resulted in successfully performed verification for face and detection of the usage of 
keyboard (keyboard detection, or k.d., in Figs 2 and 3 ), leading to a slow decrease of 
trust level with k=0.0008. In the third time interval, only face is successfully verified, 
with no usage of keyboard detected. This leads to an average decrease of trust level, 
with k set to 0,001. For clarity, this interval is also identified in Fig. 2 with the arrow 
with label "average". In the fifth time interval, at second 111 face and fingerprint 
subsystems session¸ ii) verify that if successfully verify the operator identity, resulting 
in raising the trust level to 0,98 according to Table 1. Note that in Fig. 2 every time 
the operator is using the keyboard the trust level drops, in fact the usage of the 
keyboard was detected (keystroke detection), but keystroke recognition failed or was 
not performed due to insufficient data. Then the algorithm follows in a similar manner 
alternating different successful verifications in the time intervals for the whole 
duration of the experiment, with a predominance of face recognitions (the cases in 
which only one biometric trait is verified always refer to face). On the whole set of 10 
runs, 1 facial image per second was acquired, and if face was detected, the algorithm 
processed the image. This resulted in an average of 5 missed face recognition per run 
(obviously, this is strictly dependent on the face recognition algorithm). Fingerprint 
lead only to an average of 2 mismatches out of approximately 200 checks per run, 
while keystroke lead to an average of 15 mismatches out of 24 attempts per run.  
The second scenario aims to show the possible behavior of the prototype when the 
operator leaves the workstation unattended, and consequently it is expected that the 
session will terminate due to failed biometric recognition or no acquisition of 
biometric data. In this experiment, we observe that ultimately the trust level decays 
Fig. 2. Successful verifications: trust level is 
always above the threshold 
 
Fig. 3. Operator leaving the workstation 
unattended after a while. 
  
below the threshold, resulting in session expiration. We show a sample run of the 
experiment in Fig. 3, as the others behave similarly. A strong authentication is 
initially performed with the same outcome as in the previous experiment. Then the 
trust level slowly decreases, given the recognition of face and the usage of keyboard, 
until second 131 in which the two biometric traits face and fingerprint are correctly 
acquired and verified. These are newly verified at second 149. Then the decay of the 
trust level is set to average because only the face is verified, until second 267 when 
the trust level is raised thanks to identity verification via face and keystroke 
recognition (e.g., the operator after reading some text was able to write an answer). 
The resulting trust is set to 0.87 following Table 1. At this point, no more biometric 
verification are successful, resulting in a fast decrease of the trust that leads to 
reaching the timeout in around 36 seconds. The threshold is ultimately reached at 
second 303. Such timeout is considered adequate for the purpose of Secure!, as in 
general this time is too short to have the operator leave the workstation unattended 
and execute commands or acquire data. 
Finally, the last scenario is conducted in a room where the only source of lighting 
is a window placed behind the operator. The runs performed led to an unexpected 
termination of the session, because the facial recognition failed repeatedly leading to a 
decay of the trust thresholds. The implication is that it is required to set the control 
room environment appropriately in order to have our solution work properly. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper presented our realization of a continuous multi-modal biometric 
authentication system for the operator active in the Secure! control room. The 
protocol is able to transparently acquire face, fingerprint and keystroke traits to 
continuously verify the identity of the operator without his explicit involvement. The 
paper described the solution, its prototype realization and execution. Results show 
that, despite obvious limitations due to the necessity of continuously provide 
biometric data, when appropriately tailored for a working environment our solution 
allows maintaining the worker authenticated and improving system security. 
As future work we are building and executing several test sessions with a larger 
number of different operators using Secure!, to investigate the tradeoff between 
security and usability for the different settings of the authentication system. 
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